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Abstract 
Purpose – This work seeks to investigate post-crisis measures banks have adopted in a 
bid to manage liquidity risk. It is based on the fact that, the financial liquidity market was 
greatly affected during the recent economic turmoil and financial meltdown. During the 
crisis,  liquidity  risk  management  disclosure  was  crucial  for  confidence  building  in 
depositors and shareholders. 
Design/methodology/approach – The study investigates if Basel II pillar 3 disclosures 
on liquidity risk management are applied by 20 of top 33 world banks. Bank selection is 
based on information availability,  geographic balance and possibility of understanding 
the language in which information is provided. This information is searched from the 
World  Wide  Web,  with  a  minimum  of  one  hour  allocated  to  ‘content  search’,  and 
indefinite time for ‘content analyses’. Such content scrutiny is guided by 16 disclosure 
principles classified in four main categories.
  
Findings –  Only  25%  of  sampled  banks  provide  publicly  accessible  liquidity  risk 
management information, a clear indication that, in the post-crisis era, many top ranking 
banks do not still take Basel disclosure norms seriously,  especially the February 2008 
pre-crisis warning by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 
Implications/limitations  – Bank stakeholders should easily have access to information 
on liquidity risk management. Banks falling-short of making such information available 
might not inspire confidence in customers and shareholders in event of financial panic 
and turmoil. Like in the run-up to the previous financial crisis, if banks are not compelled 
to  explicitly  and  expressly  disclose  what  measures  they  adopt  in  a  bid  to  guarantee 
stakeholder  liquidity,  the  onset  of  any  financial  shake-up  would  only  precipitate  a 
meltdown. The main limitation of this study is the use of the World Wide Web as the  
only source of information available to bank stakeholders. 
Originality/value – The contribution of this paper to literature can be viewed from the 
role it plays in investigating post-crisis measures banks have adopted in a bid to inform 
stakeholders on their management of liquidity risk.
Keywords: Post-crisis, liquidity risk management, banks.
Paper type: Qualitative finance research paper.
JEL Classification: D80, E50, G00, G18.
1. Introduction
Liquidity Risk Management (LRM) has become increasingly vital in the banking 
industry, especially with the recent financial meltdown and economic down-turn. During 
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the crisis,  increasing credit  concerns  and feeble market  liquidity  animated  a  cycle  of 
deteriorating asset market values and deleveraging. Authorities around the world sort for 
a  solution as inter-bank lending came to a  halt,  credit  risk and capital  flight  became 
common-place,  and banks were on their  knees  in  search of  liquidity.  Many financial 
institutions were bailed-out or restructured. The inability of a bank to meet up with its 
financial obligation/liability is a premise on which crisis may result. This issue may be 
due  to  deterioration  in  asset  quality  or  general  loss  of  confidence  in  the  financial 
institution due to circumstances more or less related to the bank in question. It therefore 
becomes  imperial  for  banks  to  develop policies  and standards  that  best  measure  and 
manage their liquidity positions on an on-going basis. More so, it is also necessary to 
project funding liquidity issues that could crop-up during a crisis event (stress testing and 
scenario analyses). In this paper we attempt to piece together standard practices of bank 
LRM, while keeping a close on ‘Basel II pillar 3’ disclosure criteria. The reason we look 
up to Basel principles is, in February 2008, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
published ‘Liquidity Risk Management and Supervisory Challenges’1 which somewhat 
predicted the financial crisis. The report emphasized that banks had failed to take account 
of  a  number  of  fundamental  principles  of  LRM.  It  further  stressed  many  financial 
institutions  did  not  conduct  stress  tests  and  scenario  analyses  because  they  did  not 
consider severe and prolonged liquidity disruptions as very likely. The ensuing financial 
meltdown  justified  and  gave  much  credit  to  this  report.  It  is  therefore  our  goal  to 
investigate  what  post-crisis  disclosure  measures  have been taken into account  by top 
world banks. Findings shall be relevant to bank stakeholders as well as policy makers.  
 
2. Literature review
2.1 Literature on liquidity risk management
Measuring and managing liquidity go hand-in-glove. A good liquidity monitoring 
and measurement policy determines more or less management decisions on bank liquidity 
positions on an on-going basis, especially in periods of adverse scenarios like financial 
1The report emphasized that banks did not have an adequate framework that ideally accounted for the 
liquidity risk presented by individual products and business lines. Most banks did not take into 
consideration the amount of liquidity, crucial for contingency obligations.
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crisis. A very recent example of bank periodical liquidity management could be borrowed 
from Merrouche  and Schanz  (2010).Their  study which  focuses  on  the  U.K payment 
system suggests  that,  early in  the day,  when settlement  banks are  not  sure that  their  
counter-parties to whom they make payments would pay-back, they stop doing so. In this 
wise, healthy banks remain unaffected by disruptions caused by operation outage, thus 
preventing affected banks acting as liquidity sinks. Generally,  a bank with operational 
outage receives money both from the central banks and other banks but is unable to make 
payments due to more or less, information and/or technology issues which could pose a 
systematic risk if not sufficiently monitored at the beginning of the day.
Concerning  the  use  of  market  positions,  Dinger  (2009)  completely  tests  a 
hypothesis resulting from the works of Demirgüc-Kunt et al. (1998) and, Detregiache and 
Gupta  (2004).  The  thesis  supported  by  these  authors  suggests  foreign  banks  have  a 
stabilizing  impact  because  they  have  access  to  diversified  international  sources  of 
liquidity.  Dinger  on his  part  presents  evidence  to  justify  the significant  difference  in 
behavior  between  transitional  and  local  banks.  He  asserts,  during  stable  periods 
transnational banks hold less liquid reserves than local banks and during crisis, hold more 
liquid reserves. Dinger (2009) further presents evidence to show how transnational banks 
smooth the local money market volatility in small emerging economies and also help in 
integration of interbank markets. Much earlier, Qian et al. (2004) had looked into the 
problem from the  perspective  of  a  financial  system design.  In  comparing  banks in  a 
dynamic economy, they found-out both the banking system and the market could provide 
partial  liquidity  insurance to investors.  Evidence  suggested a full-participation market 
with intergenerational trading could provide more liquidity and insurance through wealth 
transfer across generations.
With regard to contingency planning, Ratnovski (2009) recently stressed the need 
for a good lender of last resort policy which should incorporate bank capital information 
and reduce distorting rents. This sub-optimal liquidity solution could be very costly in 
terms of rents if a proper assessment of assets is not taking into account. Therefore, in 
compliance with this last resort lender requirement, he recommends much focus on ex-
post positive capitalization than ex-ante liquidity.  To put this perspective clear, banks 
with positive liquidity ex-ante of crisis that the central bank supports may not necessarily 
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have positive net worth ex-post, making sub-optimal liquidity solutions based on ex-ante 
liquidity positions unsustainable ex-post. It is therefore in the banks interest to insure this 
policy is not conditioned on liquidity but on ascertained net worth,  since quantitative 
liquidity requirement is very expensive. 
Looking at the weight of country specific effects on LRM disclosure, Vento and 
La  Ganga  (2009)  point  out,  disparity  in  regulatory  and  supervisory  regimes  across 
countries could significantly affect bank LRM and supervision. Our work will also seek 
to investigate if banks established in certain countries have a specific disclosure pattern. 
Concerning cultural specific effects, it is worthwhile laying some emphasis on Islamic 
banks.  Most recently,  Ismal  (2010) in an empirical  survey on the Indonesian Islamic 
banking industry  indentifies  rational  depositors’  sensitivity  to  interest  rate  return  and 
higher  portions  of  short-term deposits  (one  month)  as  the  main  sources  of  liquidity 
problems.  Meanwhile  liquidity  instruments  which  help  in  attenuating  these  liquidity 
issues  include  (in  decreasing  order):  borrowing  from  the  Islamic  money  market, 
borrowing from parent company, withdrawing private placements from other banks, use 
of bank capital to cover demanded liquidity,  selling of Islamic securities in secondary 
market,  asking for  depositors  to  wait  for  extra  days  and use of  intra  day emergency 
liquidity facility. 
2.2 Literature on bank information disclosure
From a financial intermediary view-point, Chen and Hassan (2006) demonstrate 
that, if banking transparency is improved by increasing the precision of public signals2, 
this  may  increase  the  likelihood  of  a  contagious  bank-run.  Beside  this  inauspicious 
account of transparency, it is worthwhile disclosing other definitions for improvement in 
transparency exist. For instance, if transparency is defined as the way the banking system 
ameliorates the manner in which depositors know whether problems of failed banks are 
systematic or idiosyncratic in nature, then improvement of transparency from this angle 
should instead dwarf a contagious run. The skepticism of Chen and Hassan (2006) on 
transparency related to the improvement of public signals is shared by some authors. For 
instance Cordella and Yeyati (1998) posits that, full transparency of bank risks, could 
2 For example, when banks invest at time ‘0’, public signals about the projects are revealed at time ‘1’. 
However, the time interval between investment and public knowledge could still be sub-divided. 
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lead to bank failure via increasing interest  on deposits  that could accrue from riskier 
positions.   The  effect  of  this  disclosure  risk  is  further  emphasized  by  Admati  and 
Pfleiderer  (2000)  who  access  that,  when  firms  are  positively  correlated,  disclosing 
information on one could affect others, especially if the revealed information can trigger 
a contagious run. A study which somewhat antagonizes this thesis is that of Demirgüç-
Kunt et al. (2008). They find out, banks in countries which better comply with Basel Core 
Principles  related  to  information  provision;  receive  more  favorable  Moody  financial 
strength ratings. 
Regarding what type of information our research might be concerned with, Boot 
and Thakor (2001), in asking the kind of information firms should voluntarily disclose, 
consider three types of disclosures: (1) information that complements that available only 
to informed investors; (2) information that complements that available to all investors; (3) 
a substitute to information that informed investors would have obtained themselves. From 
the perspective of this study, our search for information from the World Wide Web falls 
within  the  first  and  second  categories.  The  third  information  category  is  ruled-out 
because “inside information can hardly be obtained from a public source”. Therefore, the 
present work will aim to: (1) verify if banks have adopted more appealing post-crisis 
disclosure  principles  on  LRM  (Basel  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision,  February 
2008);  (2)  investigate  if  country  regulatory  and  supervisory  regimes,  play  a  role  in 
determining disclosure patterns (Vento and La Ganga, 2009); and finally (3) determine 
summarily whether  such explicit  disclosure is  relevant  for stakeholder  confidence (as 
opposed to Chen and Hassan, 2006).  
3. Methods
3.1 Content search 
By ‘content’,  we refer  to  information  on LRM. As  shown on table  I,  the  20 
selected  banks  are  among  the  top  33  in  terms  of  asset  value  according  to  a  recent 
classification3. Chosen banks are selected such that, their headquarters are in countries 
which are members of the Basel Committee. We rely principally on the World Wide Web 
for information because: firstly, it is the most widely accessible source of information to 
3 Rankings as of 11 August 2010. From Bankers Almanac. 
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present and potential stakeholders (clients and shareholders); and secondly, most banks 
have an international character, which makes the web and particularly their websites the 
turning point of any information about them. We sacrifice at least one hour in search for 
LRM information.  This  is  on account  of  the  fact  that,  we hypothetically  assume,  on 
average a present or prospective stakeholder should spend such amount of time perusing 
for  such  information.  On the  World  Wide  Web and  corresponding websites,  we use 
searching  sentences  like:  “liquidity  risk  management”,  “cash  risk  management”, 
“liquidity  management”,  “cash  management”,  “liquidity  risk”,  “Basel  II  pillar  3 
disclosure”, “Basel II”, “pillar disclosure”…..etc. Targeted content from annual reports is 
post-2008, implying we focus on analyzing annual reports of financial institutions that 
were published after the start of the recent financial crisis. 
3.2 Content analysis  
This is a form of qualitative analysis that deals specifically with documents and 
texts. Interpreting and understanding ‘disclosures’ we find falls within this framework. 
We endeavor to verify how information found reflects underlying disclosure principles 
below. LRM disclosures according to Basel II, pillar 3, should include: risk identification 
and assessment;  risk  management  and mitigation;  and risk  monitoring  and reporting. 
Therefore, we focus on the following when perusing and analyzing a particular content:
-development of a structure for managing liquidity( strategic risk management, tactical 
risk  management,  adequacy  of  information  system,  managing  structure  of  liquidity 
strategy, role of directors and day-to-day liquidity risk management);  
-measurement  and  management  of  net  funding  requirements  (establishment  of  a 
measuring and monitoring process, use of “what if” scenarios, and review of liquidity 
management assumptions);
-management  of  market  access  and  contingency  planning  (managing  market  access, 
contingency planning, and stress testing and scenario analysis are necessary) and 
-last  but  not  the  least  criterion,  the  role  of  internal  control,  supervisors  and  public 
disclosure in improving liquidity management;
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Table I. Presentation of selected banks
Banks World 
Rankings°
Assets 
(million US$)
Capital
(million US$)
 1) BNP Paribas S.A(France) 1st 2,952,221 35,955.52
 2)Royal Bank of Scotland(United Kingdom) 2nd 2,739,361 23,623.45
 3)Credit Agricole(France) 3rd 2,234,350 40,648.49
 4)Barclays Bank Plc(United Kingdom) 4th 2,226,593   4,606.81
 5)Deutsche  Bank(Germany) 5th 2,153,033   2,279.77
 6)Lloyds Banking Group plc(United Kingdom) 6th 1,658,736 16,909.41
 7)JP Morgan Chase and Co.(USA) 7th 1,627,684   1,785.00
 8)Banco Santander S.A(Spain) 8th 1,593,298   5,902.44
 9)The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi(Japan) 9th 1,494,350  12,000.15
10)Société Générale(France) 10th 1,468,725    1,327.12
11)Bank of America-Merrill Lynch(USA) 11th 1,468,725    1,327.12
12)ING(Netherlands) 12th 1,441,673       731.50
13)UBS(Switzerland) 15th 1,296,709       344.36
14)Bank of China(China) 16th 1,281,409   37,181.63
15)The Sumitomo Bank(Japan) 20th 1,162,096     6,670.54
16)Citibank(USA) 21st 1,161,361        751.00
17)Bank of Scotland plc (United Kingdom) 23rd 1,067,890     9,441.30
18)Credit Suisse(Switzerland) 25th    997,705          45.46
19)Banca Intesa(Italy) 26th     896,476     9,525.11
20)ABN Ambro Holding NV(Netherlands) 33rd     673,379     2,657.10
Notes:°Rankings as of 11th of August 2010. Figures are consolidated and date on 31/12/2009. All countries 
above are member of the Basel Committee. U.S.A: United States of America. Source (Bankers Almanac). 
Table II. Banks and Liquidity Risk Management Disclosure (LRMD)
Implicit or No  LRMD Explicit LRMD
BNP Paribas S.A(France) Deutsche  Bank(Germany)
Royal Bank of Scotland(United Kingdom) UBS(Switzerland)
Credit Agricole(France) Barclays Bank Plc(United Kingdom)
JP Morgan Chase and Co.(USA) Lloyds Banking Group plc(United Kingdom)
Banco Santander S.A(Spain) ING(Netherlands)
The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi(Japan)
Société Générale(France)
Bank of America-Merrill Lynch(USA)
Bank of China(China)
The Sumitomo Bank(Japan)
Citibank(USA)
Bank of  Scotland plc(United Kingdom)
Credit Suisse(Switzerland)
Banca Intesa(Italy)
ABN Ambro Holding NV(Netherlands) 
Notes: U.S.A: United States of America. Source (author’s synthesis)
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4. Case Studies
Various case studies are analyzed based on whether bank websites and the World 
Wide  Web  provide  explicit  information  on LRM. As  summarized  on table  II,  while 
fifteen  banks do not  have  accessible  information,  five  do.  Banks  with  implicit  LRM 
information mostly provide details on what they could do to help clients manage their 
liquidity. Their information is meant to inform clients on how well their deposits could be 
managed profitably than,  on what  measures  they would take to ensure depositors  are 
refunded upon demand (prevention  of  liquidity  risk).  They use terms  like  :“we offer 
services  to  help you:  consolidate  your  balances,  understand your  daily  cash position, 
address  short  and  long  term  research  objectives,  self  direct  or  automate  your 
investments…etc”(Bank of America-Merrill Lynch, for example). Analyzed disclosures 
are synthesized on tables III, IV, V, and VI below.
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Table III. Developing a structure for managing liquidity
Liquidity 
Management 
Principle(s)
Deutsche  Bank UBS Barclays Bank plc Lloyds Banking 
Group plc
ING
Day-to-day 
liquidity 
management 
strategy
“Our liquidity risk management 
approach starts at the intraday level 
(operational liquidity) managing the 
daily payments queue, forecasting cash 
flows and factoring in our access to 
Central Banks”.
“UBS continuously 
tracks its liquidity 
position and asset 
and liability profile 
over time”  “In 
response to the 
market dislocation 
discussed above, 
UBS increased both 
its modeling and 
monitoring 
frequency”.
“The Group policy is that each operation 
must ensure that it has access to sufficient 
intraday liquidity to meet any obligations it 
may have to clearing and settlement 
systems”.
“Daily monitoring 
and control processes 
are in place to 
address both 
statutory and 
prudential liquidity 
requirements.”
“ALCO Bank has delegated 
day-to-day liquidity 
management to Financial 
Markets Amsterdam, which is 
responsible for managing the 
overall liquidity risk position of 
ING Bank…”  
“Within Financial Markets the 
focus is mainly on the daily and 
intraday cash and collateral 
positions and it is policy to 
sufficiently stagger day-to-day 
funding requirements”;
Role of directors
“The underlying policy, including the 
bank’s risk tolerance, is reviewed and 
approved regularly by the Management 
Board. The policy defines the liquidity 
risk limits which are applied to the 
Group”.
n.s.a n.s.a “Routine reporting is 
in place to senior 
management and 
through the Group's 
committee structure”
n.s.a
Management 
structure for 
liquidity strategy
-Short term liquidity
-Unsecured funding
-Asset liquidity
-Stress testing and Scenario analysis
n.s.a “Barclays Treasury operates a centralized 
governance and
control process that covers all of the 
Group’s liquidity risk
Management activities”. 
-the group asset and 
liability committee 
-the senior asset and 
liability committee
-structural liquidity risk
-tactical liquidity risk
-contingent liquidity risk
Adequate 
Information 
system.
“Our cash flow based reporting system 
provides daily liquidity risk information 
to global and regional management”.
n.s.a n.s.a n.s.a n.s.a
Tactical risk 
management
“It then covers tactical liquidity risk 
management dealing with the access to 
secured and unsecured funding sources”.
n.s.a “Execution of the Group's liquidity risk 
management strategy is carried out at 
country level within agreed policies, 
controls and limits, with the Country 
Treasurer providing reports directly to 
Barclays Treasury to evidence conformance 
with the agreed risk profile”
n.s.a “From a tactical, short-term 
perspective the liquidity risk 
resulting from the short term 
cash and collateral positions is 
managed”.
Strategic risk 
management
“Finally, the strategic perspective 
comprises the maturity profile of all 
assets and liabilities (Funding Matrix) on 
our balance sheet and our issuance 
strategy”.
n.s.a “The objective of the Group's liquidity risk 
management strategy is to ensure that the 
funding profile of individual businesses and 
the Group as a whole is appropriate to 
underlying market conditions and the 
profile of our business in each given 
country.”
n.s.a n.s.a
Notes: n.s.a: not specifically applicable. Source (author’s synthesis)
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Table IV. Measuring and monitoring net funding requirements.
Liquidity Management 
Principle(s)
Deutsche  Bank UBS Barclays Bank Plc Lloyds Banking Group 
plc
ING
Establishment of 
measuring and 
monitoring process 
“Our reporting system tracks 
cash flows on a daily basis 
over an 18-month horizon. 
This system allows 
management to assess our 
short-term liquidity position in 
each location, region and 
globally on a by-currency, by-
product and by-division basis. 
The system captures all of our 
cash flows from transactions 
on our balance sheet, as well 
as liquidity risks resulting 
from off-balance sheet 
transactions”.
n.s.a “The need to monitor, manage 
and control intraday liquidity 
in real time is recognized by 
the Group as a critical process: 
any failure to meet specific 
intraday commitments would 
have significant consequences, 
such as a visible market 
disruption”.
“Liquidity is actively 
monitored at business unit and 
Group level at an appropriate 
frequency. Routine reporting 
is in place to senior 
management and through the 
Group's committee structure, 
in particular the group asset 
and liability committee and 
the senior asset and liability 
committee which meet 
monthly”.
“For the measurement and 
monitoring of the actual 
liquidity position the focus is 
on the daily cash and collateral 
position”.
Use of “what if” 
scenarios.
“In addition, we keep a 
dedicated strategic liquidity 
reserve containing highly 
liquid and central bank 
eligible securities in major 
currencies around the world to 
support our liquidity profile in 
case of potential deteriorating 
market conditions”.
n.s.a “These stress scenarios 
include Barclays-specific 
scenarios such as an 
unexpected rating downgrade 
and operational problems, and 
external scenarios such as 
Emerging Market crises, 
payment system disruption 
and macro-economic shocks”.
“Firstly, the Group stress tests 
its potential cash flow 
mismatch position under 
various scenarios on an 
ongoing basis”.
“For this purpose ING Bank’s 
weekly and monthly liquidity 
positions are stress tested 
under a scenario that is a mix 
between a market event and an 
ING specific event”.
Review of liquidity 
management 
assumptions.
“As of year-end 2009 we have 
implemented a new reporting 
system which focuses on 
contractual cash flows from 
wholesale funding sources on 
a daily basis over a 12-month 
horizon”.
n.s.a n.s.a “The scenarios and the 
assumptions are reviewed at 
least annually to gain 
assurance they continue to be 
relevant to the nature of the 
business”.
n.s.a
Notes: n.s.a: not specifically applicable. Source (author’s synthesis)
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Table V. Managing market access and contingency planning
Liquidity 
Management 
Principle(s)
Deutsche  Bank UBS Barclays Bank Plc Lloyds Banking Group 
plc
ING
Managing 
market access
“Unsecured funding is measured on a 
regional basis by currency and 
aggregated to a global utilization report. 
The management board approves limits 
to protect our access to unsecured 
funding at attractive 
levels”…….“Liquidity outflow limits 
(Maximum Cash Outflow Limits), 
which have been set to limit cumulative 
global and local cash outflows, are 
monitored on a daily basis to safeguard 
our access to liquidity”.
n.s.a “The Group maintains a 
portfolio of highly marketable 
assets including UK, US and 
Euro-area government bonds 
that can be sold or funded on a 
secured basis as protection 
against any unforeseen 
interruption to cash flow.”
“Additionally, unsecured 
funding is managed within 
specific term limits. The term 
of unsecured liabilities has 
been extended, with average 
life improving by four months 
from eight months at the end 
of December 2007 to 12 
months at the end of 
December 2008”.
n.s.a “Holding a broad portfolio of 
highly marketable assets that 
can be used to obtain secured 
funding”.
 “Maintaining an adequate 
structural liquidity gap taking 
into account the asset mix and 
both the secured and 
unsecured funding 
possibilities of ING Bank”.
Contingency 
planning
“The strategic liquidity reserve amounts 
to EUR 54.9 billion as of December 31, 
2009. This reserve is held in addition to 
the bank’s cash balance and the 
collateral the bank needs to support its 
clearing activities in euro, U.S. dollars 
and other currencies which are held in 
separate portfolios around the globe”.
“Combined with the broad 
diversity of its funding 
sources, its contingency 
planning processes and its 
global scope, these additional 
measures have proven 
extremely helpful in enabling 
UBS to maintain a balanced 
asset / liability profile, in spite 
of this period of 
unprecedented market 
dislocation”.
“The output informs both the 
liquidity mismatch limits and 
the Group's contingency 
funding plan. This is 
maintained by Treasury and is 
aligned with the Group and 
country business resumption 
plans to encompass decision-
making authorities, internal 
and external communication 
and, in the event of a systems 
failure, the restoration of 
liquidity management and 
payment systems”.
“the Group has a contingency 
funding plan embedded within 
the Group Liquidity Policy 
which has been designed to 
identify emerging liquidity 
concerns at an early stage, so 
that mitigating actions can be 
taken to avoid a more serious 
crisis developing”.
“Contingency liquidity risk 
relates to the organization and 
planning for liquidity 
management in times of stress. 
Within ING a specific crisis 
team is responsible for the 
liquidity management in times 
of crisis”.
Stress testing
“Stress testing is fully integrated in our 
liquidity risk management framework. 
We track contractual cash flows per 
currency and product over an eight-week 
horizon (which we consider the most 
critical time span in a liquidity crisis) 
and apply the relevant stress case to all 
potential risk drivers from on balance 
sheet and off balance sheet products. 
Beyond the eight week time horizon we 
analyze on a quarterly basis the impact 
of a change of business model out to 12 
“This involves monitoring its 
contractual and behavioral 
maturity profiles, projecting 
and modeling its liquidity 
exposures under various stress 
scenarios and monitoring its 
secured funding capacity.”
“Stress testing is undertaken 
to assess and plan for the 
impact of various scenarios 
which may put the Group's 
liquidity at risk.” 
"Treasury develops and 
monitors a range of stress tests 
on the Group's projected cash 
flows. These stress scenarios 
include Barclays-specific 
“the Group stress tests its 
potential cash flow mismatch 
position under various 
scenarios on an ongoing 
basis.”
“Behavioral adjustments are 
developed, evaluating how the 
cash flow position might 
change under each stress 
scenario to derive a stressed 
cash flow position. Scenarios 
cover both Lloyds Banking 
“For stress testing purposes 
the liquidity risk positions are 
calculated in line with the 
regulatory reporting 
requirements for liquidity risk 
of the Dutch Central Bank”.
12
months. The liquidity stress testing 
provides the basis for the bank’s 
contingency funding plans which are 
approved by the Management Board. 
Our stress testing analysis assesses our 
ability to generate sufficient liquidity 
under critical conditions and has been a 
valuable input when defining our target 
liquidity risk position. The analysis is 
performed monthly”.
scenarios such as an 
unexpected rating downgrade 
and operational problems, and 
external scenarios such as 
Emerging Market crises, 
payment system disruption 
and macro-economic shocks. 
The output informs both the 
liquidity mismatch limits and 
the Group's contingency 
funding plan.” 
Group name specific and 
systemic difficulties”.
Scenario 
analysis
“As of year-end 2009 we also have 
introduced a scenario which combines a 
systemic market shock with a multi 
notch rating downgrade. 
Under each of these scenarios we 
assume that all maturing loans to 
customers will need to be rolled over 
and require funding whereas rollover of 
liabilities will be partially impaired 
resulting in a funding gap. We then 
model the steps we would take to 
counterbalance the resulting net shortfall 
in funding. Countermeasures would 
include the bank’s long cash balance and 
unencumbered asset inventory as well as 
our Strategic Liquidity Reserve”….. 
“The scenarios have been based on 
historic events, such as the 1987 stock 
market crash, the 1990 U.S. liquidity 
crunch and the September 2001 terrorist 
attacks, liquidity crisis case studies and 
hypothetical events. Also incorporated 
are new liquidity risk drivers revealed 
by the latest financial markets crisis: 
prolonged term money-market freeze, 
collateral repudiation, limited fungibility 
of currencies, stranded syndications, 
systemic knock-on effects and further 
liquidity risk drivers such as intraday 
liquidity risk”.
“This involves monitoring its 
contractual and behavioral 
maturity profiles, projecting 
and modeling its liquidity 
exposures under various stress 
scenarios  and monitoring its 
secured funding capacity”.
“For this purpose ING Bank’s 
weekly and monthly liquidity 
positions are stress tested 
under a scenario that is a mix 
between a market event and an 
ING specific event.”
Notes: n.s.a: not specifically applicable. Source (author’s synthesis)
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 Table VI. Role of internal control, supervisors and public disclosure, in improving liquidity risk management.
Liquidity Management 
Principle(s)
Deutsche  Bank UBS Barclays Bank Plc Lloyds Banking Group 
plc
ING
Internal control
“As of year-end 2009 we have 
implemented a new reporting 
system which focuses on 
contractual cash flows from 
wholesale funding sources on 
a daily basis over a 12-month 
horizon. The system captures 
all cash flows from unsecured 
as well as from secured 
funding transactions. 
Wholesale funding limits, 
which are calibrated against 
our stress testing results and 
approved by the Management 
Board; describe our maximum 
tolerance for liquidity risk. 
These limits apply to the 
cumulative global cash 
outflows and are monitored on 
a daily basis”.
n.s.a n.s.a “Liquidity is actively 
monitored at business unit and 
Group level at an appropriate 
frequency. Routine reporting 
is in place to senior 
management and through the 
Group's committee structure, 
in particular the group asset 
and liability committee and 
the senior asset and liability 
committee which meet 
monthly”.
n.s.a
Role of supervisors
Management directors are 
mentioned three times in a 
supervising role. No 
intermediate supervisors are 
disclosed.
n.s.a n.s.a “Routine reporting is in place 
to senior management and 
through the Group's 
committee structure, in 
particular the group asset and 
liability committee and the 
senior asset and liability 
committee which meet 
monthly. In a stress situation 
the level of monitoring and 
reporting is increased 
commensurate with the nature 
of the stress event”.
n.s.a
Public disclosure  World Wide Web World Wide Web World Wide Web World Wide Web World Wide Web
Notes: n.s.a: not specifically applicable. Source (author’s synthesis
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5. Discussion of Results 
Much discussion on analyzed content of disclosures would be monotonous, as it 
would simply be literally recycling what is already much explicit and self explanatory on 
synthetic tables (III, IV, V and VI). For instance with respect to table III (developing a 
structure for managing liquidity), Deutsche Bank appears to provide the most exhaustive 
information.  On a positive note, all five banks take very seriously,  an intra-day LRM 
strategy.  But  for  Deutsche  Bank,  the  presence  of  an  adequate  information  system is 
seldom elucidated. Regarding net funding requirements, only UBS is on the sideline as 
compared to other banks. However this difference is not any relevant when it comes to 
‘market access and contingency planning’, which is taking seriously by all banks. Only 
Deutsche Bank and Lloyds Banking Group plc account for the ‘role of internal control, 
supervisors and public disclosure, in improving liquidity management’. 
6. Conclusion
Our  attempt  to  probe  into  post-crisis  liquidity  risk  management  disclosure 
following  pre-crisis  shortcomings  emphasized  by  the  Basel  committee  on  banking 
supervision  have  yielded  results,  not  unexpected.  The  low  rate  of  bank  disclosure 
confirms  a  study  by  Chen  and  Hassan(2006)  which  shows  that,  banks  do  not  take 
seriously improvements in transparency of the banking system because, it could breed 
chances of a contagious  bank run.  Our results  also comply with Cordella and Yeyati 
(1998) in the perspective that, full disclosure of bank risks could lead to bank failure 
through increasing  interest  rate.  A further  emphasis  on  the  relevance  of  results  with 
respect to literature could be appreciated from Adamti and Pfleiderer (2000) who had 
earlier shown that, disclosure of negative information could engender a contagious run 
and systematic collapse,  especially when correlation between elements of the banking 
sector is highly positive. In validating the hypotheses we brought forward at the onset of 
this work, we can conclude: (1) with respect to the World Wide Web, banks have not 
adopted more appealing post-crisis disclosure principles; (2) country regulatory systems 
don’t  affect  disclosure  patterns  ;(3)  disclosure  doesn’t  seem  to  be  any  relevant  in 
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determining the content of stakeholder confidence since banks do not still consider severe 
and prolonged liquidity disruptions as very likely.
As a policy implication, like in the run-up to the previous financial crisis, 
if banks are not compelled to explicitly and expressly disclose what measures they adopt 
in a bid to guarantee stakeholder liquidity, the onset of any financial turmoil would only 
precipitate a meltdown. 
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